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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
would be enormous. The standards and regulations of the state plus
the numerous aids given the public school children have continued
to increase until the church-supported school has found itself unable
to meet such demands. It is under these circumstances that the
schools request that their pupils be given the benefit of public wel-
fare legislation. The support of a religious institution is remote at
best and the relatively small expenditure of public funds involved
may save the treasury the much larger cost of educating children
induced to attend public schools.
The principle of separation of church and state as set forth in
our constitution is still a cornerstone of our democratic system. The
application of this principle, however, is not immutable. The dynamic
nature of the constitution requires that its provisions be interpreted
and extended in the light of conditions prevalent in each successive
generation. In relation to public support of sectarian institutions
this is no less true than in relation to other problems. It is sub-
mitted that the time has come for a re-examination of the incidents
attending the First Amendment and a recognition of the fact that
the circumstances which lead to its strict interpretation no longer
exist. The courts must be vigilant in protecting our constitutional
guarantees but they are not bound by interpretations of another age.
GEORGE F. MASON, JR.,
JAMES R. SCHULE.
ANGEL v. BULLINGTON
STATE LIMITATION ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Where the only basis for federal jurisdiction is diversity of citi-
zenship, must the federal courts apply the jurisdictional limitations
of the state in which the action is being tried? The answer to this
question is determined by the designation of jurisdictional limitation
as substantive or adjective law.
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its
Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a
matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law.
Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or 'general'
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be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts." ' The doc-
trine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 2 is applicable in cases involving
diversity of citizenship; federal courts are bound by state law and
state policy, whether it be statutory or decisional, on matters of
substantive law only.
Since 1938, when Erie Railroad v. Tompkins was decided, fed-
eral courts have been differentiating between adjective law and sub-
stantive law. Substantive law is defined as that part of law which
creates, defines, and regulates rights as opposed to adjective or rem-
edial law which prescribes the method of enforcing rights and obtain-
ing redress for their invasion.3
Generally, the distinction is clear, but where a rule of procedure
affects a substantive right, as will hereinafter appear, what course
must the federal court follow? To what extent would the doctrine
of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins be applicable to these borderline cases?
Three years after the Erie case, the court was faced with the
application of the conflict of laws rule laid down therein.4 The ac-
tion was prosecuted in a District Court in Delaware for breach of a
New York contract. Under New York law ' the measure of dam-
ages is greater by virtue of interest upon the total amount awarded
from the time when the verdict was rendered to the time of entering
judgment. The court held that the full faith and credit clause does
not require that a state, contrary to its own policy, shall give effect
in actions brought locally on contracts made in other states, to laws
of those states relating, not to the validity of such contracts, but to
the right to add interest to the recovery item of damages.
The court was under the opinion that by virtue of the doctrine
of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins the conflict of laws rules to be applied by
the federal court, is that of the state in which it is sitting, "Other-
wise, the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly dis-
turb equal administration of justice in co-ordinate state and federal
courts sitting side by side." 6
The question of burden of proof also came before the Supreme
Court in Cities Service v. Dunlap.7  Under Texas law, on an issue
involving a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice, the burden
of proof is upon him who attacks the legal title and asserts a su-
perior equity. The court stated that, ". . . it relates to a substan-
tial right upon which the holder of recorded legal title to Texas land
1 Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78, 82 L. ed. 1188, 1194 (1938).
2 Ibid.
3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) p. 1672.
4 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 85 L. ed. 1477
(1941).
5 N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Act § 480.
6 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 496, 85 L. ed.
1477, 1480 (1941).
7 308 U. S. 208, 84 L. ed. 196 (1939).
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may confidently rely." 8 The Supreme Court treated burden of proof
as a rule of substantive law, thus requiring the federal court to apply
the local rule of law. In 1943, the court passed upon the burden of
proving contributory negligence,9 and held that the federal court must
apply the local law, in diversity cases.
In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 10 the court considered the effect
of a state statute of limitations. It was held that if a plea of the
statute of limitations would bar a suit in a state court for equitable
relief, a federal court whose jurisdiction rests upon diversity of citi-
zenship ought not to afford relief. Recently the United States Su-
preme Court was faced with the problem of jurisdictional limitation
placed on a state court by the state legislature and its effect on a
federal court.
II
By its decision in the case of Angel v. Bullington 11 the Supreme
Court has extended the Erie doctrine. The facts in the case are
therefore important. In 1940 Bullington, a citizen of Virginia, -sold
land in Virginia to Angel, a citizen of North Carolina. Only part
of the purchase price was paid. For the balance Angel executed a
series of notes secured by a deed of trust on the land. Upon default
of one of the notes, Bullington, acting on an acceleration clause in
the deed, caused all other notes to become due and payable, and
called upon the trustees to sell the land. The sale was duly made in
Virginia and the. proceeds of the sale applied to the payment of the
notes.
Bullington began suit for the deficiency in the Superior Court
of North Carolina and Angel countered with a demurrer, the sub-
stance of which was that a state statute 12 precluded recovery of
such a deficiency judgment. The Superior Court overruled the de-
murrer, and on appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court,'18 the
action was dismissed.
After dismissal of his action by the North Carolina Supreme
Court, Bullington did not elect to appeal to the United States Su-
preme Court on the ground that the United States Constitution pre-
cluded North Carolina from shutting the' doors of its court to him.
s Cities Service Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U. S. 208, 212, 84 L. ed. 196, 198(1939).
8 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109, 87 L. ed. 645 (1943).
10326 U. S. 99, 89 L. ed. 2079 (1945).
11 - U. S. -, 91 L. ed. 557 (1947).
12 N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) § 45-36. "In all sales of real property by
mortgagees and/or trustees under powers of sale contained in any mortgage or
deed of trust hereafter executed, . . . the mortgagee or trustee or holder of
the notes secured by such mortgage or deed of trust shall not be entitled to
a deficiency judgment on account of such mortgage, deed of trust or obliga-
tion secured by same: . . ."
' 
3 Bullington v. Angel, 220 N. C. 18, 16 S. E. (2d) 411 (1941).
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Instead he instituted a new suit in the Federal District Court of
North Carolina. 14 Angel pleaded in bar, the judgment in the North
Carolina action. The district court and the circuit court of appeals 15
held that the North Carolina statute is a limitation on the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of that state, and does not deprive the federal
district court of jurisdiction of an action brought by a non-resident
to recover a deficiency judgment.
The United States Supreme Court reversed 16 and held that
where the only basis for federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizen-
ship, the federal court must apply the jurisdictional limitation of the
state statute. The Supreme Court stated that the dismissal by the
state court was res judicata as to all issues open for decision, and
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction a federal court is "in effect,
only another court of the state." 17
A judgment rendered on a demurrer is conclusive, by way of
estoppel, of facts confessed by the demurrer, as would be a verdict
and judgment finding the same facts. But a judgment on demurrer,
based merely on formal or technical defects, and raising a question
of pleading, or want of jurisdiction is no bar to a second cause of
action for the same claim.' 8
The dismissal by the North Carolina court was on the basis
of jurisdiction and would not have been a bar to an action in a court
having jurisdiction. Since the dismissal is based on a jurisdictional
limitation, which deals with the manner of prosecuting the action to
enforce his remedy, and in no way impairs his substantive right, in
what court may he prosecute his action? Federal law gives juris-
diction to the federal district court on the grounds of diversity of
citizenship. 19
Before considering the question of federal jurisdiction, the legal-
ity of the state's right to determine what suits it will hear must be
ascertained. "The power of a state to determine the limits of the
jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the controversies which
shall be heard in them, is, of course, subject to the restrictions im-
posed by the Federal Constitution." 20 Such restrictions as the con-
14 Bullington v. Angel, 56 F. Supp. 372 (W. D. N. C. 1944).
'15 Angel v. Bullington, 150 F. (2d) 679 (C. C. A. 4th 1945), cert. granted,
326 U. S. 713, 90 L. ed. 421 (1945).
16 Angel v. Bullington, - U. S. -, 91 L. ed. 557 (1947).
17 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 89 L. ed. 196 (1945).
18Wiggins Ferry Co. v. 0. & M. Ry., 142 U. S. 396, 35 L. ed. 1055
(1892); Stewart v. Masterson, 131 U. S. 151, 33 L. ed. 114 (1889) ; Bissell
v. Spring Valley Township, 124 U. S. 225, 31 L. ed. 411 (1888); House v.
Mullen, 22 Wall. 42, 22 L. ed. 838 (U. S. 1874); Aurora City v. West, 7
Wall. 82, 19 L. ed. 42 (U. S. 1868); Gilman v. Rives, 10 Pet. 298, 9 L. ed.
432 (U. S. 1836).
19 REv. STAT. § 629 (1875), as amended, 54 STAT. 143 (1940), 28 U. S. C.
§ 41, subd. 1 (1940).
20 McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 292 U. S. 230, 233, 78 L. ed. 1227,
1229 (1934).
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tract clause,"' the full faith and credit clause,22 the privileges and
immunities clause 23 must be observed, and a state cannot avoid its
constitutional obligation by denying jurisdiction to its courts.24 The
question of the validity of the state statute to bar this type of action
was not passed upon, but there is dicta in the opinion, to the effect,
had an appeal been taken from the North Carolina Supreme Court,
the judgment would have been for the plaintiff. Mr. Justice Reed,
in the dissenting opinion, states the statute is unquestionably uncon-
stitutional by federal tests.25
A state need not enforce a foreign contract or obligation when
to do so would violate the expressed public policy of the forum on a
matter not governed by Federal Law or Constitution.26 The state may
prohibit performance within its borders of a contract validly made
elsewhere, if the performance would violate its laws,27 but it may
not, on grounds of public policy, ignore a right which has lawfully
vested elsewhere, if the interest of the forum has but slight conrnec-
tion with the substance of the contract obligation. 2
As pointed out above plaintiff may have validly contested the
state statute but "[plaintiff] forewent his right to have a higher
court, . . . [the United States Supreme] Court, enable him to win
his chance by holding that he was right and that the North Carolina
Supreme Court was wrong. He cannot begin all over again in an
action involving the same issues before another forum in the same
State." 29
III
For purposes of diversity jurisdiction a federal court is "in
effect only another court of the state." 30 Diversity jurisdiction is
founded on the assurance, to non-resident litigants, of courts free
21 U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10.
22 U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1.
23 U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.24Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411, 64 L. ed. 638 (1920).25 Angel v. Bullington, - U. S. -, 91 L. ed. 557, 563 (1947); 2 BEALE,
CONI.IcT OF LAWS §227.3 (1935 ed.). "Whether there may be a recovery
of the amount by which the proceeds of the mortgage sale are insufficient to
pay the debt, called the deficiency, depends on the law of the state of the
situs of the land; (Sea Grove B. & L. Ass'n v. Stockton, 148 Pa. 146, 23 Atl.
1063 [1892]) therefore suit may be brought in a state which does not allow
recovery (McGirl v. Brewer, 132 Ore. 422, 285 Pac. 208 [1930])."
26 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry., 175 U. S.
91, 44 L. ed. 84 (1899); May v. Mulligan, 36 F. Supp. 596 (W. D. Mich.
1939).
27 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U. S. 397, 74 L. ed. 926 (1930).
28 Hartford Ind. Co. v. Delta Co., 292 U. S. 143, 78 L. ed. 1178 (1934).
29 Angel v. Bullington, - U. S. -, 91 L. ed. 557, 561 (1947).
30 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 89 L. ed. 196 (1945).
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from the susceptibility of potential local bias.3' It is stated in Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. York 32 that Congress afforded out-of-state liti-
gants another tribunal, not another body of law.
To say that a plaintiff has a substantive right, but he lacks a
remedy, is to say the plaintiff is without a right. Where a state has
validly closed the doors of its courts to a particular type of action,
it is declarative of public policy and is substantive in nature, but
adjective by definition.
Under the doctrine of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins it is oftentimes
difficult to differentiate between substantive and remedial law. In
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, the court refused to distinguish and
label the statute of limitations as one or the other. "In these areas
whether a particular situation or issue presents one aspect or the
-other depends upon how one looks at the matter. As form cannot
always be separated from substance in a work of art, so adjective
or remedial aspects cannot be parted entirely from substantive ones
in these borderline regions." 33
IV
Where a state has validly limited the jurisdiction of its courts,
and the action is tried in a federal court on the sole basis of diversity
of citizenship, the federal court must apply the jurisdictional limita-
tion. The doctrine of Angel v. Bullington has its ramifications.
In David Lupton's Sons v. Auto. Club of America 34 it was held
that the state statute 35 prohibiting suit by a foreign corporation, on
a contract made by it in New York, while doing business before ob-
taining a certificate of authority, was a limitation on the jurisdiction
of New York courts and in no way affected federal jurisdiction. New
York has seen fit to deprive the foreign corporation of a right of
action, when said corporation has violated its laws. Since the cor-
poration is foreign, it would have an opportunity to have its case
tried in federal district court. Today, the holding in Angel v.
Bullington would compel the federal court to observe the limitation,
since a federal court, on basis of diversity of citizenship, is only an-
other court of the state.
Another example of a substantive right which may be affected
by this holding is the stockholders derivative action in New York.
Under New York law,36 where a stockholder, owning less than 5%
of outstanding stock and said stock has a market value of less than
31 Bank of the United States v. DeveatLx, 5 Cranch 61, 87, 3 L. ed. 38, 45
(U. S. 1809).
32 326 U. S. 99, 112, 89 L. ed. 2079, 2088 (1945).
33 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 116, 89 L. ed. 2079, 2090(1945).
34 225 U. S. 489, 56 L. ed. 1117 (1912).
35 N. Y. GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 218.
36 N. Y. GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 61-b.
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$50,000, brings a derivative action he may be required to give se-
curity to the corporation and other defendants. In two recent
cases 37 the federal court held that the ,statute in no way affected
substantive rights and the federal court was not bound to apply the
state law. Had the same actions been brought in the New York
courts, they could not have been maintained without giving such
security. It would seem that Angel v. Bullington would require the
federal court to give effect to this statute requiring security, when
the action is being tried in a federal court on the basis of diversity
grounds alone.
It should be noted that where resort is had to a federal court,
not on grounds of diversity of citizenship, but because a federal right
is claimed, the limitation upon the courts of a state do not control a
federal court sitting in that state.38
It is evident that the holding in the Angel v. Bullington case is
within the spirit of the Erie case. The federal court is not admin-
istering another body of law, it merely gives out-of-state litigants a
court free from local bias. Although it may at times be difficult to
designate a particular law as substantive or adjective, it is evident
that where a state closes its doors to a particular type of action, the
law is substantive in nature and is expressive of the state's public
policy. Since the Erie case, Congress has permitted the holding,
without statutory change, and none is needed. A federal court in
diversity cases is only another court of the state, and the result of
a case tried before its tribunal should be substantially the same as
that of a state court.
The plaintiff is not entitled to a greater right in federal courts,
on the basis of diversity of citizenship, than he would receive in the
state court.
GEORGE H. HEMPSTEAD, JR.
THE PATENT REFUGE OF MONOPOLISTS
There has long been uncertainty as to the extent to which patent
holders might extend their patent monopoly without infringing the
purposes of the antitrust laws. In United States v. Line Material
Co.,1 a case involving an industry-wide patent license price-fixing
scheme, Judge Duffy likened this clash to "what would happen if an
37 Boyd v. Bell, 64 F. Supp. 22 (S. D. N. Y. 1945) ; Craftsman Finance &
Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
38 Honmberg v. Armbecht, 327 U. S. 392, 90 L. ed. 743 (1946).
'64 F. Supp. 970 (E. D. Wis. 1946).
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